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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[ATITUMN

mentation will include a writing "reciting that a security interest therein
remains in or will remain in, or has passed to or will pass to the entruster."' The draftsman who sets about preparing forms for use by
entrusters will quickly discover that a transfer of a security interest
pursuant to a trust receipt does not fit well with the required trust
receipt recitals. An attempt to cover the transfer in the trust receipt
leads to such strange language as "I hereby transfer; I acknowledge
that a security interest remains in or will remain in, or has passed to
or will pass to the entruster." A separate document transferring a security interest, signed before the trust receipt, would encounter the statutory words, "Pursuant to a trust receipt... obtains new value upon
the transfer ...." No useful purpose would be served by a separate
transfer document taken after the trust receipt has been executed. The
evident inconvenience of separate trust receipt and transfer stages and
documents suggests that the combined form may be preferable despite
the necessary peculiarity of its wording.
It will have been noted that only dealers can be trustees under the
new subsection. The term "dealer" is not defined in the Act and there
may be some theoretic potential for controversy about its meaning. It
would appear that in current practice trust receipt financing is restricted to borrowers whose activities should meet any fair definition
of "dealer" and that the risks of trouble with the term are minimal
under subsection (c).
WARUEN L. SHATTUCK

TORTS
Guest Statute. Chapter 132 of the session laws amends the Guest
Statute' to an extent which may only be described as opening up
gorgeous vistas to the guest-litigant and his attorney; thar is gold in
them hills now, and the one or two prospectors a year who set out to
stake their claims under or around the old statute are bound to be
followed by a horde of new ones. That statute, passed in 1933, limited
recovery by guests to battery situations-to damages resulting from
"accidents" which were "intentional," as it was put-which as a practical matter precluded any recovery under the statute itself. This left
the alternative of proving that the plaintiff was not a guest at all, a
goal attempted either by showing joint adventure, payment for trans5

This material, which was continued from the original statute, follows the new

subsection (c)as quoted.
1 RCW 46.08.080.
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portation, or disclaimer by the passenger of the guest status. The joint
adventure route was closed in 19432 (or at least has not been successfully traveled since that time); the disclaimer route in 1949'; the payment route is still open but hedged about with so many decisional
obstacles as to be not nearly so easy and attractive as it was. The situation under the Act had become static: no new law, but simply a series
of fact questions for the jury. With no preliminary thunder on the left
came Chapter 132, and a bleak prospect it must be for the court and
the insurance carriers.
It adds two new grounds for recovery by the guest: injuries as "the
result of said owner's or operator's gross negligence or intoxication."
As vehicles for a take-off into the wild blue yonder from the jury room,
neither can be surpassed. "Intoxication" is not only a perennial problem in definition and fact-finding; it is also a sort of legal fissionable
material, and the fact that the defendant has had a drink is apt to
start a chain-reaction in the jury (whether chosen from drinking members of the panel or not) which can bring an end to all problems of
liability at once. Unless the result is to be left wide open, somehow
a criterion of "intoxication" which "results" in injury must be concocted. Perhaps it was not practicable to attempt it in the statute;
perhaps it is felt that this is exactly the sort of socio-moral-legal problem which the jury was invented to resolve, and the less interference
the better. The cheering thought is that we have muddled through
equally difficult situations before and can do it again. In favor of the
defendant on the issue is the fact that two things must be comparatively rare: the driver who is intoxicated without his guest's knowledge, and the guest who has not had a drink with his host. Thus comes
into play contributory fault, and its companion, assumption of risk,
though the latter may have to be refined somewhat by the court to
reach full effectiveness as a defense.
"Gross negligence" as the touchstone for decision is even more difficult to handle. Intoxication is at least a physical fact with which most
people have some familiarity, but gross negligence is a purely legal
concept which brings even courts to bay. Once past the schoolboy definition that gross negligence is the absence of slight care there is not
much to be said about it except to quote Lord Cranworth's dictum that
"gross negligence is ordinary negligence with a vituperative epithet."
2 Poutre v. Saunders, 19 Wn2d 561, 143 P.2d 554 (1943).
3 Aldns v. Hemphill, 33 Wn2d 735, 207 P.2d 195 (1949); 25 Wash. L. Rev. 246
(1950). The writer still believes the case to be unsupportable.
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Originating in the little field of bailment as a borrowing from the Civil
Law, its extension to all negligence cases brought a deluge of appeals
and confusion which has been the despair of all courts to deal with it.
I know of no writers who approve it, and the prevailing view seems to
be that there are no "degrees" of negligence as a matter of law, but
simply degrees of care as a matter of fact. It seems odd that it should
be a popular phrase in guest statutes; can it be that one legislative
draftsman never bothers to look at the confusion which follows in the
wake of another, but simply follows, lemming-like? Certainly the idea
of negligence itself is nebulous enough without the added confusion
of "degrees"; if only the court can avoid being snatched back into the
bad old days when "gross negligence" was the basis for the recovery
of a guest against his host4 everyone will be the gainer.
I think it can, and without doing violence to the statutory language.
"Gross negligence" is a concept so devoid of content that it is something
like a pitcher: what it is a pitcher of depends on what has been put
into it. The statute seems to be seeking a basis for recovery somewhere
between negligence--that is to say, inadvertence to danger-and the
intentional injury of the old Act. I think the court has found that basis
in Adkisson v. Seattle,' where gross negligence is described as "wanton
misconduct," and where the court cites the Restatement of Torts"
definition of "conduct in reckless disregard of safety": the actor, aware
of the risk and the probability of harm, nevertheless goes ahead, reckless of the consequences. The state of mind is not that of negligence,
where there is lack of appreciation of peril; it is not willful misconduct,
because he does not intend the result; but he certainly can be described as being wanton, or heedless, or reckless, and the jury may
legitimately infer his state of mind from the way in which he acted
under the circumstances. At best, this approach will nearly solve the
problem; at worst, it at least gives something understandable to tell
the jury. Ordinary contributory fault will of course not be a defense;
it will take a corresponding state of mind on the part of the plaintiff
before he is defeated.
One final matter must be mentioned. The amendment requires,
before recovery may be had under the Guest Statute, that "proof of the
cause of action is corroborated by competent evidence or testimony
independent of, or in addition to, the testimony of the parties to the
4This was the situation before the Guest Statute of 1933.
542 Wn.2d 676, 258 P.2d 461 (1953).
0 Restatement, Torts, § 500 (1934).
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action." This is the latest example of that perennial distrust of party
testimony and of the jury which has appeared so often in statute and
decision; in fact the reason assigned as justification for the original
Guest Statute was that it would tend to prevent perjurious collusion
between host and guest to the ruin of insurers. That the notion also
reflects upon the bar is perhaps beside the point, and in any event it is
likely that one who dwells in the groves of Academe should not question it. It will be the rare case in which, in some fashion, the requirement cannot be met, and it is almost a certainty that it will not be
applied to those cases where the plaintiff's theory is that he was not
a guest at all.
JOHN W. RIcHARDs
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
The 1957 Legislature passed two bills, H.B. 267 (Chapter 70) and
H.B. 617 (Chapter 196), which effected significant changes in the
industrial insurance laws of the state of Washington. The most important of these changes are described and discussed below.
Action Against Persons Whose Negligence Caused Compensable
Injury or Disease. A basic quid pro quo underlies all workmen's compensation statutes. The employer makes substantial concessions as
the price of his limited, but absolute, liability. In exchange, the employee gives up some of his rights to bring damage suits for injuries he
has sustained.1
The Washington statute is no exception. RCW 51.04.010 provides:
All phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy
*

.

.sure and certain relief for workmen, injured in extra-hazardous

work, and their families and dependents is hereby provided ...to the
exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except
as otherwise provided in this Act . . .to that end all civil actions and

all civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction
of the courts of the state 2over such causes are hereby abolished, except
as in this Act provided.
But all workmen's compensation statutes recognize that where the
negligence of a "stranger" or a "third person" was the cause of comSLarson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 71.20 (1952).
2RCW 51.32.010 provides: "Each workman ... or his family or dependents...
shall receive compensation ...and, except as in this title otherwise provided, such payment shall be in lieu of any and all rights of action whatsoever against any person
whomsoever..."
3Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 72 (1952).

